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Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP

Copied to:

• John Edwards, Information Commissioner
  
• Silkie Carlo, Director, Big Brother Watch
  
• Rt Hon Baroness Williams, Minister of State, Home Office

10 June 2022

Dear Sir Iain

Risks to UK from Chinese State-Controlled Surveillance

I write further to聽the event at which we both spoke on the above聽subject earlier this week.

I would begin by endorsing your characterisation of the breadth and depth of the risks, their provenance and, most importantly perhaps,聽the聽urgency聽they now call for. 聽The key question,聽as we on the panel agreed,聽remains what is to be done about them.

For my part, my correspondence with聽the relevant companies聽-聽and also with聽government departments聽-聽on聽this matter is聽all in the public domain but has聽yet to聽produce聽any聽discernible聽action.聽While the arguments deployed in this debate embrace a wide spectrum of issues, from my perspective as Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner the聽matter can聽be simplified to one of trust. 聽The use of biometric surveillance by the state is a matter of increasing sensitivity and significant public concern - not just here but globally.聽聽As almost all of the technological capability for biometric surveillance is privately owned, the only way we will聽as a nation聽be able to harness the聽many聽legitimate uses of that technology in the future is in trusted partnership with trusted private sector partners.

In short, the people we trust - the police, fire and rescue, local聽authorities and聽the government itself -聽must聽be able to trust their technology partners, both in terms of security and聽of聽our聽shared聽ethical and professional values.聽聽And the publicly available evidence聽tells me that some of these companies 聽- notably Hikvision and Dahua - simply cannot be trusted, partly because of concerns about the role they and their technology are believed to have played in perpetuating the appalling treatment聽of Uyghur Muslims as set out in the report of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee last year聽(and recognised in the government鈥檚 formal response), but聽also because of those companies鈥� absolute refusal to engage with even the most cursory level of public accountability in response to those concerns.

The聽report by Big Brother Watch聽has corroborated what the surveillance community has known for some time: that almost every aspect of our lives is now under surveillance聽using聽advanced systems designed by, and purchased from, companies under the control of other governments, governments to whom those companies have data sharing obligations聽within聽their own domestic legal framework. 聽The proliferation of聽these systems聽means聽we have聽a public surveillance infrastructure聽built on 鈥榙igital asbestos鈥櫬爎equiring both聽considerable caution when聽handling the聽products聽installed by a previous generation and, as a priority,聽a moratorium on any further installation聽until we fully understand the risks聽we have created.

I have been assured by ministers that these issues will be addressed in the Public Procurement Bill currently before Parliament and it is my sincere hope that聽any聽subsequent legislation聽will be sufficiently聽comprehensive,聽not just聽to address聽the聽letting of new public surveillance contracts,聽but聽also聽to reinforce聽the fidelity of聽our聽country鈥檚聽critical聽surveillance infrastructure in its entirety.

I will shortly be conducting a survey across police and local authorities to identify how many are relying on these surveillance systems but this will only inform a small part of the picture; what is ultimately needed is a full inventory across our critical national infrastructure.

To my mind this is not about interfering in another country鈥檚 domestic affairs; this is about reinforcing the legitimate expectations in ours.

Yours sincerely

Professor Fraser Sampson
Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner